Workers’ Organizing Action Committee - Uprising 2026: Half a Step Forward, Two Steps Back

Note: the text is polished in its translation to English by an AI bot

Introduction:

This text was prepared amid the days leading up to the second week of the protests and was on the verge of publication; however, on January 8 the internet was cut off, and developments took on an essentially different character, requiring serious revision of certain sections. The several-week shutdown of communication channels, combined with censorship and the biased coverage of satellite networks, created limitations in our understanding of the overall picture—especially the war-like atmosphere.

On the one hand, the масшiveness of the killings shocked everyone and psychologically paralyzed many; yet we are obliged, as a matter of duty, to examine these events with so-called cold and critical reason. Now that the internet has been partially restored, we intend—based on our observations and interventions—to review January 2026 anew: What happened? How did we move from “Woman, Life, Freedom” to “Pahlavi is coming back”? How and from where did Reza Pahlavi reappear? Is the danger of war serious? Where are we heading? And finally, what interventions could and can the revolutionary left undertake?

The International Picture:

During the 12-day war, we emphasized that without considering the specific historical-global moment we are in, one cannot analyze ongoing events in Iran and their trajectory based solely on internal factors. The prospect of continued global economic stagnation, intensifying competition over market division, and an arms race intertwined with new drone and artificial intelligence technologies are all features of this new era.

Consequently, proxy and attritional conflicts in spheres of influence are on the rise: Ukraine, Venezuela, Taiwan, Iran, and even regions such as Armenia and Jammu and Kashmir—situated in the backyards of regional powers—are but examples of contested territories. These territorial disputes do not always take the form of direct warfare; they may instead result in bargaining between superpowers at an agreed price, as occurred in Afghanistan, Syria, Rojava, and Armenia.

The Domestic Picture:

If the defining feature of December 2017 was the speed of its geographic spread, of October 2019 its aggressive and explosive nature, and of September 2022 the leadership of women and national minorities alongside its democratic slogans, then January 2026 had the following characteristics:

◼️ Speed and Nationwide Spread: The rapid geographic expansion and cross-class participation resembled 2017. However, from the turning point of January 8 onward, in terms of aggressiveness it rose to the level of October 2019—and even surpassed it.

◼️ Class Composition: The issue began with the “dollar” but quickly escalated to calls for overthrow. What started with Tehran bazaar merchants spread in less than three days from center to periphery, engulfing dozens of large and small cities and rapidly taking on a mass character: workers, employees, students, small proprietors, and others participated. Though it began in the capital, as in 2019, smaller and satellite cities bore greater weight. We categorize this comparison into a three-phase framework.

The Three Phases of the Protests:

The initial fervor in Tehran, despite attracting early attention, quickly subsided with the securitization of the bazaar and announcements of widespread closures. Within a short time, smaller and satellite cities—such as Lordegan, Azna, Fasa, Fooladshahr, Malekshahi, Marvdasht, Ramhormoz, Abdanan, and others—ignited the second and qualitative phase of protests, becoming the driving force of aggressive actions. Street barricades, attacks on banks and chain stores, and attempts to seize government buildings (such as governor’s offices and police stations) signaled not only a stark difference between protests in Tehran and peripheral cities but also differences in the intensity of repression.

While images of the first wave of people killed by live ammunition in smaller cities were circulating, gatherings in Tehran [1] were more scattered, smaller, rapid, and neighborhood-based, met with water cannons and tear gas. By the end of the second week, however, protests in major cities—especially Tehran and Mashhad—intensified and reached an explosive stage on January 8. This date marked a turning point that launched the third, main, and final phase of protests, characterized by an unprecedented simultaneous mass presence and widespread aggressive forms in metropolitan centers and provincial capitals (Tehran, Mashhad, Kermanshah, Rasht, etc.).

The third phase was brief and rapid, lasting only two or three days under repression, but in terms of crowd size and intensity it was such that the government could only contain it through indiscriminate and large-scale street killings.

The Role of National Minorities:

In the second phase (up to the second week), Lur and Bakhtiari cities (Lorestan, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Khuzestan provinces) as well as Kurdish cities in Ilam and Kermanshah displayed the most cohesive and aggressive protests. They transformed relatively calm first-phase protests into street warfare.

However, the comparatively limited presence of Kurdistan and Baluchistan—two leading regions in the 2022 protests—was noteworthy. It is not far-fetched to connect this absence with the prominence of pro-Pahlavi slogans in this round of protests.

The Unprecedented Communications Shutdown:

This time, the Islamic Republic spared even the smallest communication channels during the internet blackout: temporary suspension of landlines, mobile phones, SMS, domestic messaging platforms, shutting down even regime-affiliated channels on domestic platforms, group chats, comment sections on commercial sites and domestic news agencies, heavy satellite jamming, and confiscation of signal dishes (likely Starlink).

This policy had several consequences:

1. The relatively rapid interruption of protests and news dissemination. Unlike previous years, the third- and seventh-day memorials of slain protesters did not become major security challenges for the regime. It is therefore expected that similar tactics may be repeated around the fortieth-day commemorations.

2. With each blackout, the regime grows more agile and adept at cutting communications. Unlike 2019, when shutdowns disrupted major economic apps (banking, ride-hailing, e-commerce), such leverage no longer exists. Prolonged shutdowns have also broken some public resistance to forced migration to domestic platforms. The “whitelisting” method—considered one of the most dangerous forms of internet censorship—was first tested during the 12-day war and implemented again mid January (marketed as “gradual reconnection”).

3. While independent news sources were inaccessible and even regime-affiliated channels censored, and most satellite channels jammed, Iran International—by strengthening and multi-signaling its broadcasts—became one of the few accessible news sources in households. Previously criticized for its reactionary and misleading role during the 2022 protests, this network has since openly become the voice and exclusive loudspeaker of Pahlavi, employing similar methods with greater intensity: acting as an organizing organ for Pahlavi, initially downplaying the 8-9 January killings to promote his calls, exaggerating imminent regime collapse, rumors of officials fleeing to Moscow and Venezuela, and advocating a “liberating” foreign attack.

Shifts Within the Islamic Republic:

Unlike protests from 2017 to 2022, where intra-factional rivalry allowed one faction to leverage street protests against another, the current period shows a unified oligarchic bloc. Reformist, principlist, moderate, hardliner, IRGC-affiliated—and soon perhaps monarchist—boundaries are fading as a collective alliance forms to secure shared interests in the post-Khamenei era.

Accordingly, amid wartime conditions, a shock-therapy project [2]—“one death, one mourning”—is underway without even token internal opposition. Just before protests, non-subsidized gasoline prices rose; during protests, not only did the dollar surge, but preferential currency subsidies were eliminated and discussions of cutting bread subsidies confirmed.

This is not a blind gamble but a calculated move to consolidate resources for the post-Khamenei period. Ali Khamenei has long embodied this oligarchic bloc, and when minor dissent appears, he reiterates that shock policies proceed with his approval and cross-factional consensus.[3]

The Wartime Atmosphere:

The January 2026 protests occurred six months after an Israeli attack and amid a fragile ceasefire. Israel did not achieve its strategic objectives during the 12-day war; thus, we face an unfinished project. This factor influenced protests in several ways:

1. Direct Israeli financial, military, and media support for Pahlavi’s alternative-building.

2. Attempts to build imperialist consensus for intervention under the guise of supporting protests.

3. Framing imperialist war as the quickest and least costly path to liberation in some public minds.

4. Strengthening the regime’s repression apparatus under the pretext of confronting a foreign enemy.

The Pahlavi Conundrum:

We now arrive at the “elephant in the room”: the unprecedented prominence of reactionary monarchist slogans like “Long Live the Shah” and “Pahlavi is coming back.” For many observers, this sudden rise was unexpected—including for us.

How did Reza Pahlavi gain such traction now, despite previous isolation and loss of allies due to exclusivist, patriarchal, and pro-war tendencies?

Some attribute this to media propaganda; others to a budding fascist mass movement[4]; still others deny the phenomenon altogether as media fabrication[5]. Yet anyone present in the streets could not deny its emergence. Media hegemony alone cannot explain why, at this specific historical moment, Pahlavi met such reception when previous calls fell flat.

From close range, many chanting “Long Live the Shah” are not ideological monarchists but desperate people oscillating between ballot box and street, from reformists to now Pahlavi, seeking a force with “real power” against the Islamic Republic. After the suppression of “Woman, Life, Freedom,” a new force appeared between 2024-2025 that demonstrated both will and capacity to strike the regime: Israel.

For the first time in decades, a small but powerful state at war with the Islamic Republic has chosen to fully back Pahlavi. Thus, Pahlavi—long politically ineffective—has become a symbol of Israel’s perceived real power on Iranian soil: the unseen bullet, the missile strike, the threat of regime destabilization.

In this sense, the widespread illusion is less about Pahlavi himself and more about the “real power” behind him—imperialism and a supposedly “liberating” war.

The propaganda apparatus has been active for years, and merely referring to “media hegemony” cannot explain why and how, at this particular historical moment, Pahlavi was met with such public reception—when throughout all these years none of his calls had received even the slightest response and he had, in a sense, been in socio-political isolation.

Third, confronting crowds chanting “Long Live the Shah” has been shocking for many. But what from a distance appears unfamiliar and frightening becomes more understandable up close. When you are among the crowd and speak with them—when you recognize your neighbors, relatives, even family members among them—you quickly realize that they are not committed royalists. They are the same people who, “out of desperation” and guided by the logic of the “lesser evil,” [6] have constantly swung like a pendulum from the ballot box to the streets, from Khatami to Mousavi and now to Pahlavi—and just months ago made the same pendulum swing from “Israel, strike!” to “Israel, don’t strike!” For many of us this is déjà vu: we have seen how people who loathe the Islamic Republic to their core say, “We hate them, but… for now this guy is standing against them,” and chant “Ya Hossein, Mir Hossein!”

The fundamental reason behind all these zigzags has always been the same: exhausted and desperate masses, tired of repeatedly paying the price, are searching for a force that possesses “real power” against the Islamic Republic. For years (mistakenly), the entire apparatus of the Islamic Republic was personified in a single individual—Ali Khamenei[7]. Thus, for a long time the reformists were imagined as the “real power” opposite him—until events showed people that they possessed no such independent power, and whatever they had derived from alliance with and service to him. After passing through the “deception of reform,”[8] for the first time in the spontaneous nationwide uprisings from 2017 to 2022, people positioned themselves as agents of their own destiny without recourse to ruling power factions. In those uprisings, slogans were almost entirely negative—rejecting the Islamic Republic in its entirety—until in 2022, for the first time, slogans gradually shifted toward positive demands and sketched a democratic framework for an alternative (still without appealing to any superior power).

After the suppression of the “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising, in the period 2024-2025 a new force emerged that demonstrated both the “will” and the “sufficient force” to crush or strike a decisive blow against the Islamic Republic. As we previously noted, for years confrontation between the Islamic Republic and Israel had followed the logic of a “controlled” conflict on both sides (even in incidents such as the targeting of the consulate in Syria or the so-called “True Promise” operations, the conflict remained within those rules). But with the helicopter crash of Ebrahim Raisi in 2024, another sign appeared: that the will existed in Israel to escalate confrontation to full-scale military conflict if necessary. It took about a year for that will to manifest itself during the 12-day war. If the helicopter crash allowed a shadow of ambiguity and deniability for both sides, Israel’s missile strike on a meeting of the Supreme National Security Council (including the heads of the three branches of government) left little doubt about its intention to alter Iran’s political landscape.

However, since no regime change can be achieved by missiles alone—and at best can only create a power vacuum—Israel simultaneously devoted its resources over these two years to constructing Pahlavi as an alternative.

In reality, Pahlavi is the same politically ineffective piece he has always been. He has not overnight transformed into a charismatic, populist leader capable of mobilizing impoverished and repressed masses into a neo-fascist movement. Nor does he possess the organization or structure to become a serious and stable political force in Iran’s political arena. The difference this time is that, after decades, for the first time a small but powerful state at war with the Islamic Republic has decided to fully back him[9]. Otherwise, for three decades his entire political effort was directed toward gaining entry into the IRGC–reformist bloc—and he failed, because no one forms alliances with a force lacking power.

Thus, “Reza Pahlavi”—formerly powerless—becomes a symbol of Israel’s “real power” on Iranian soil: the unseen bullet that strikes Raisi, the missile that hits the security council, the rubble falling on state broadcasting headquarters, the trigger aimed at senior officials [10]. His transformation from an ineffective pawn into the “symbol” of a force with “real power,” especially when accompanied by (hollow) messages from Trump about “helping the protesters,” gave him added weight in the streets. At minimum, our observations from several cities show that many who led chants of “Pahlavi is coming back” expressed, in private conversations, no particular attachment to Pahlavi himself and described the slogans as “tactical.” In this sense, what we are witnessing is less a widespread illusion about Pahlavi himself than a widespread illusion about the “real power” behind him—imperialism and its supposedly “liberating” war.

We emphasize the word “symbol” because the “real power” behind him (Israel) remains purely negative: capable of destruction and weakening the existing power, and at best creating a vacuum—but lacking mechanisms to replace it. Hence over these two years Israel invested efforts into building “organization,” “popular base,” and “military allies from within the regime” around him (the “National Cooperation Campaign,” which claimed 50,000 military defectors, was part of this effort). Yet such claims are more fanciful than credible to anyone with real information. However, making these claims is more of a joking than someone who has real information takes it seriously (VOA's media policies during the 2026 protests as the most important arm of the official Persian-language media of the U.S. government «, which happened to be recently under the blade DOGE monitoring [11] has come out - it shows well that the US has absolutely not taken Pahlavi's power seriously in Iran's political scene).

Yet the echo of Pahlavi’s name in Iran’s streets is not owed solely to cooperation with Israel or to media like Manoto and nostalgic narratives of his ancestors’ rule. He is also directly and indirectly indebted to assistance from the Islamic Republic itself. We will not delve here into the regime’s indirect role in inflating the Pahlavi alternative through repression of its main opponents—national minorities, labor organizations, civil and women’s groups, and other progressive forces. Nor will we explore the two-way highway between regime institutions and monarchists—where former columnists of Kayhan or members of Islamist student organizations, upon breaking away, gravitate toward the closest similar political force (i.e., Pahlavi). Instead, we will briefly review some examples of direct assistance from the Islamic Republic’s security institutions to Pahlavi.

Because such a claim is controversial without evidence, we elaborate:

A) Numerous indications suggest that many anonymous, high-follower monarchist social media accounts are in fact insecure accounts linked to the Islamic Republic’s cyber headquarters. This claim has not only been made by Pahlavi’s opponents; it has been acknowledged by his own close advisors—for example, Nima Rashdan of Farashgard stated on BBC Persian that approximately 40,000 accounts with Pahlavi imagery were operating from Tehran under the direction of the Islamic Republic’s cyber army and the IRGC [12]. Moreover, the recent move by X (formerly Twitter) to publicize account geolocations, revealing Iran-based activity among certain “monarchist” accounts, reinforces the claim that parts of the regime’s cyber army operate under monarchist cover.

B) Less than two weeks before the recent nationwide protests, during the seventh-day memorial for Khosrow Alikordi (lawyer of 2022 protest detainees), unprecedented monarchist slogans—including “Death to the three corrupt: mullah, leftist, Mujahid”—were chanted, accompanied by booing and stone-throwing at speakers such as Narges Mohammadi. Given Alikordi’s affiliation with the National Front and the political leanings of the organizers, the sudden appearance of organized monarchist disruption was striking. Participants reported suspicions of security involvement and noted the apparent immunity of those chanting from repression[13]. Disrupting and isolating a political gathering under the guise of political opposition is far more effective and “clean” than direct police force.

Beyond that, empty slogans like “Long Live the Shah” or earlier “Reza Shah, rest in peace”—which project no concrete political horizon—have discouraged many protesters seeking tangible and radical political-economic-social change, increasing their tendency to withdraw from the streets.

C) Some security-linked figures have explicitly suggested that support for monarchism functions as a security project to suffocate regime opponents by inflating a harmless matchstick. In 2018, the newspaper Jomhouri-ye Eslami reported that the slogan “Reza Shah, rest in peace” had been designed by rivals of the reformist government (though the article was later removed)[14]. More explicitly, last year Mohsen Raddadi (a professor at Imam Sadegh University) argued that “Pahlavi supporters, by sowing division within the opposition, performed a service for the Islamic Republic that no other group could.”[15]

Beyond media and cyberspace—and beyond domestic regime dynamics—Pahlavi has, for at least two years, systematically benefited from material and political-security assistance from Israel as well. An October report in Haaretz, citing research by the Citizen Lab cyber research center, described how before and during Israeli airstrikes on Iran, networks of fake accounts and AI bots—funded by the Israeli government—were mobilized to generate waves of online support for Pahlavi.

All that said, the purpose of these observations is not to deny or ignore the segment of the population that has aligned with Pahlavi. But this so-called “organic” support itself has emerged from the engineered interventions described above: the wartime atmosphere, Israel’s transformation into an active force in Iran’s political arena, extensive media and cyber campaigns, and even the Islamic Republic’s own security involvement[16]. The combination of these factors created a wave that carried many people along. Thus, while recognizing the spontaneous alignment of part of the public with Pahlavi, we do not overlook the decisive role of organized state-security-media resources in producing that “alignment”—just as two decades ago, on a much larger scale, similar resources were mobilized to construct a “popular base” for the reformist faction within the regime.

◼️ Regime change:

We have said many times—and we still maintain—that what is referred to as the “regime change” project in Iran, if it occurs, will not resemble Afghanistan, Iraq, or Libya, with bombardment followed by rebuilding from scratch. Rather, it would take place through the agency of a large faction of the currently ruling oligarchy itself, preserving them within a new shell—one that has merely removed or added a prefix or suffix to the Islamic Republic in order to prepare for the next phase of plunder.

In this equation, Reza Pahlavi is merely a media and virtual figure—whether 1 percent chant his name or 99.9 percent. He is a weak, multi-purpose pawn used both by the Islamic Republic and by Israel and the United States. For three decades, his entire effort has been directed toward gaining entry into the IRGC–reformist bloc, and the reason he has not succeeded is simply that there has been no material basis for including him. Nevertheless, Pahlavi and his circle will record January 8 as a turning point in his otherwise empty political résumé. The same Pahlavi whose calls year after year—on Yalda nights, on Chaharshanbe Suri, and similar occasions—were met with indifference or ridicule, will now attempt to leverage the events of that day to build “credibility” and weight for himself so as to be taken seriously by foreign governments.

Yet those governments stand firmly on the ground of realism. Their criterion is always the balance of real power—not the number of gallons of blood spilled or the number of names chanted in the streets. So long as Pahlavi’s actual and potential material backers (Israel and the United States) can obtain what they seek from the ruling bloc at far lower cost and without needing to play this weak card, they will assign him no function beyond that of a negotiable pawn.

Only under a specific scenario in a post-Ali Khamenei future—if the ruling oligarchic bloc, after reshaping the regime, fails to project the mirage of “political change” to the public—might it not be unlikely that a seat at the table of power would be set aside for him. Even in that scenario, however, the aim would be to share power with him, not to transfer power to him. But this scenario remains very distant and unlikely, and in our view carries little weight under current conditions.

◼️ The events of January 8, however, should not be viewed solely from the perspective of Pahlavi’s potentially shifting role. From the standpoint of recent years’ street protests as well,  was a turning point. Based on the evidence at our disposal, we state with confidence that what occurred that day was, in the precise sense of the word, unprecedented. The sheer flood of people and their decentralized spread overwhelmed riot police and security forces in a manner not previously experienced.

In some major cities such as Tehran and Mashhad, people effectively held the streets until late at night. The density of the crowds created such a level of collective security that actions could be carried out freely—including distributing leaflets and even delivering lengthy speeches among the crowd. It must be noted that this mass turnout occurred not necessarily because of, but under the pretext of—and in some cases even despite—Pahlavi’s call.

In this respect, the situation on January 8 bears a striking resemblance to 2009, when many election boycotters and regime opponents also joined protests called by Mousavi and Karroubi, while at the same time illusions about them were strong among large segments of the protesting population.

From this point of departure, we turn to the frequently asked question: how could—or, if such conditions recur in the future, how can—our intervention take shape in a situation where reactionary slogans achieve hegemony?

How could and should our intervention have been?

 If our analysis of the coming period is that the Islamic Republic is undergoing a process of transformation, and that in the emerging power bloc the boundaries between reformists, Revolutionary Guard factions, and monarchists will fade, then the slogan “Death to the Islamic Republic” is no longer an adequate intervention in this historical moment of popular uprisings.

Given the alliances and coalitions now taking shape, our intervention must likewise:

1. Target all major ruling factions — both official and “shadow” forces — simultaneously.

2. Expose the continuity of interests among the components of this bloc and clarify their interconnections.

In confronting monarchist slogans, we believe that with whatever means available we must promote simultaneous anti-clerical authoritarian and anti-monarchical slogans — even if such intervention comes from a minority position (even a single person) within a crowd largely chanting “Long live the Shah.”

Our own field experience in challenging pro-Pahlavi slogans — and even debating some of their self-appointed leaders — showed that, contrary to initial expectations, many of them are not politically coherent actors in any precise sense. Rather, they chant such slogans in an emotional state and often retreat when faced with criticism or objection. A recurring refrain during the protests was that they supported Pahlavi “out of necessity.”

Therefore, we should neither be intimidated by the atmosphere nor mistakenly assume we are confronting an army of hardened monarchist loyalists in the streets. Experience has shown that even minority intervention and open dissent can halt the spread of pro-Pahlavi slogans in a crowd, or in some cases lead sections of the crowd to adopt simultaneous anti-Islamic Republic and anti-monarchy slogans. Even where it produces none of these outcomes, it at minimum ensures that dissenting voices reach those in the crowd who were not silently endorsing such slogans.

2.

We cannot deny the democratic right of individuals to support Pahlavi, nor can we renounce our own democratic right to oppose and expose him.

We must not forget that in these gatherings we are not confronting, in every case, foot soldiers of the class enemy. Part of this social base consists of our potential class allies, who repeat reactionary slogans out of error and desperation. Therefore, our interventions — whether through slogans or discussion — should be persuasive, clarifying, and exposing in character.

One objective must be to accustom ears, from now on, to hearing a clear and confident opposition to monarchy and to the regime-change project centered on Pahlavi, while exposing its dangers and contradictions.

During the protests, we sometimes encountered hardline monarchist figures who behaved in a thuggish manner — encircling dissenters and attempting to silence opposition through intimidation. In such situations, instead of engaging in fruitless argument, their behavior should be exposed before the crowd, showing how — even before attaining power — they reproduce repression and suppress alternative voices.

We repeatedly observed that most participants watched these confrontations silently, listening to criticisms and debates in order to form their own independent judgments.

Thus we must not, through leftist purism, hand over courageous people fighting in the streets to reactionary forces. We must stand alongside people confronting repression, but with our own independent and uncompromising voice — without making concessions in exposing reactionary forces such as Pahlavi.

We must neither abandon people in the face of repression nor dissolve into the sanctification of “the people” and sheath our positions.

There were instances when comrades carried the wounded, sheltered them, removed pellets from their bodies — and later, upon discovering they sympathized with Pahlavi, engaged them frankly in discussion about monarchy and its dangers as another authoritarian force.

3.

During the 12-day war, whenever the necessity of forming a “third front” against the two reactionary poles was raised, some immediately argued that conditions were too repressive, that such political blocs required protest space.

Now, six months later, cities large and small have witnessed new waves of street protests. A new generation — those born in the 2000s — has become politicized and entered the field with new questions and new forms of engagement.

What better moment than now — when grocers, bakers, students, and homemakers have all become politicized?

Political discussion in public spaces is alive and intense. At the same time, regime-change interventions loom larger than ever, and the danger of rolling back decades of popular struggle is increasingly visible. What better moment than now — when reactionary forces have shown that in war and peace alike, in competition or compromise, they share common interests?

4.

The achievement of the 2022 protests was to shine a light on women’s issues, national minorities, and other oppressed groups.

The dominance of pro-Pahlavi slogans in this round of protests, however, risks not only burying those achievements but eliminating the popular base and core pillars of the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement.

The isolation of democratic slogans and the diminished participation of Kurdistan and Baluchestan in this phase must be seen as symptoms of this suffocating reactionary climate.

Therefore, merely rejecting both monarchy and clerical rule is insufficient. Centering the rights of oppressed groups is what can make the 2022 movement’s social base feel the space is once again suitable for participation — and shift the balance of forces against hegemonic reactionary slogans.

Workers’ rights, women’s rights, LGBTQ+ rights, and the right of self-determination for national minorities are equally threatening to both clerical and monarchical authoritarianism. For that reason, raising and generalizing these demands in protest spaces is essential to breaking the monopoly of regressive slogans.

From such solidarity and unity can the “third front” — opposition to both foreign reactionary intervention and domestic authoritarianism — emerge, so that the immense and legitimate energy of popular protest does not become fuel for coups and reactionary wars.

5.

In conditions where slogans demand nothing less than overthrow, minimal economic programs cannot serve as a political banner.

One cannot suggest to a worker chanting “Death to the Islamic Republic” that the appropriate slogan is “Wages adjusted to inflation.”

Nor is the maximalist slogan “Power to the councils” sufficient — when such councils have no tangible presence in the lived memory of new generations.[17]

To bridge this gap, more concrete transitional demands must be raised:

• Confiscation of regime assets (from Astan Quds and the Executive Headquarters of Imam’s Order to oligarchs such as Babak Zanjani and Ali Ansari).

• Factory occupations and workers’ control and management.

• Political general strike.

• Consumer committees.

• Public ownership of strategic sectors.

Campaign work must explain why the Pahlavi camp defends the property rights of factions within the Islamic Republic and their political allies — and demonstrate that their disagreement is not with the regime’s plunderous economic model, but merely with its administrators.

Will There Be War?

It is impossible to publish this text without addressing the question occupying everyone’s mind.

In our assessment, the probability of a full-scale war (like Iraq, Afghanistan, or Syria) is low. The likelihood of targeted military operations with specific objectives is much higher.[18]

Such operations may target missile sites[19], regional command centers, or involve selective assassinations[20]. Just as nuclear site destruction was “imposed” during the 12-day war, and just as serial U.S.–Israeli operations imposed a new regional balance of power, the likely objective now would be to impose limits on missile capabilities.

As before, civilians would suffer.

The likely outcome, however, would resemble what was once proposed in the 2003 “Grand Bargain”: a comprehensive agreement on nuclear, missile, and regional issues.

Whether Khamenei is physically removed or not is secondary. The structure of oligarchic rule would likely be preserved — whether in its old shell or a new one. [21] 

Other scenarios remain possible. U.S. and Israeli strategies do not fully align. Dynamics may shift.

But one dangerous factor must be acknowledged: the growing illusion among segments of the population that imperialist intervention could be liberating. This illusion may pave the way for more aggressive intervention — and, after any “grand bargain,” [22] may again transform exhausted and desperate people into passive foot soldiers of a rebranded regime, as occurred during the reform era.

Conclusion

The January 2026 protests, with all their contradictions and reactionary slogans, neither herald a fascist movement nor allow us to naïvely deny the rise of Pahlavi-ism.

Media manipulation erodes collective memory. Even those who wept in fear during the 12-day war can, months later, return to chanting for escalation.

If full-scale war is unlikely, the illusion in “liberating” imperialist intervention is no less dangerous.

Thus, if the likely scenario is targeted military operations followed by negotiation with part of the regime, then the task of the “third front” is not passive pacifism nor alignment with war-mongering — but exposing imperialist intervention in both war and peace.

Negative slogans alone are insufficient. Only by advancing affirmative democratic and transitional demands — from freedom of speech and organization to public ownership, dissolution of repressive institutions, workers’ control, and redistribution of religious-security budgets toward social needs — can revolutionary forces distinguish themselves from the many-colored reaction waiting in both war and peace.

In a field where every corner holds a class enemy armed with media, weapons, and resources, the revolutionary left’s only chance lies in bringing such demands into the streets.

Even if people do not immediately embrace them, they will not instinctively oppose them. Reactionary forces, however, will quickly reveal themselves by opposing these demands — creating opportunities to break their hegemony and build a base for a revolutionary program.

Workers’ Organizing Action Committee – 11 February 2026

Source: https://ksazmandeh.com

References

[1] In this phase, the bazaar protests had already been largely contained and subdued.

[2] “The more organized the stakeholders and the larger the crisis, the greater the chance that sudden, shock reform will succeed compared to gradualism.”

[3] “It should not be the case that some, out of ignorance of the activities underway, merely find fault; I strongly caution against insulting the heads of the country, the President, and others under such important international and domestic conditions, and I forbid and prevent individuals — whether in parliament or outside it — from doing so.” (19 January 2026)

[4] (Link to Radio Zamaneh article.)

[5] This denial is particularly common among segments of the exiled left opposition.

[6] These phrases are not our analysis; they represent the essence of what we repeatedly heard in various formulations from many pro-Pahlavi slogan-chanters during this period.

[7] Unfortunately, to some extent, this perception still exists.

[8] This keyword was used by many of these same people when referring to their earlier alignment with the reformist movement in Iran.

[9] The very fact that for decades — and until just two years ago — the Israeli government showed little favor toward Pahlavi and instead viewed the relatively isolated but organized and serious force of the Mojahedin as a cooperation partner stemmed from this assessment of Pahlavi’s real weight. Even today, one can argue that support for Pahlavi is not a policy agreed upon by all Israeli security factions, but rather the specific policy of the ruling faction.

[10] Amid rumors during and after the 12-day war about the possible assassination of Khamenei, this nickname was coined for him, referring to his temporary disappearance from public view.

[11] The U.S. Department of Government Efficiency, which began operating under Elon Musk’s supervision during the Trump period, reassessed and redefined U.S.-affiliated media and “human rights” institutions not only in terms of financial expenditures but also their promotional policies; multilingual outlets such as Voice of America were among those “purged” and “revised.”

[12] BBC Persian program Safheh Do, titled: “The New Covenant; What Is Reza Pahlavi’s Role in the Struggle Against the Islamic Republic?” — minutes 45:55 to 46:45.

[13] Interview with the daughter of Alieh Motalebzadeh (one of those arrested at the seventh-day memorial ceremony for Alikardi), minute 12.

[14] “This group has become so brazen that they send people to parliament with unprecedented slogans such as ‘Reza Shah, rest in peace’ and ‘Death to the freeloader,’ and they parade freely under police escort. These are exactly the same groups that attend Tehran Friday prayers and official marches…”

[15] Vatan-e Emrooz, February 2025 (republished by Tasnim News Agency).

[16] (Link to Haaretz article on Israeli influence operations in Iran promoting restoration of the Shah.)

[17] In other words, when most people still do not know what a “council” is and have never seen its material existence in their lived experience, merely promoting it nominally cannot bring about its realization.

[18] The proposed document known as the “Grand Bargain with Iran” was drafted in 2003 under Khamenei’s direct supervision and approval and delivered to the United States. It included provisions such as ending support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad, accepting the two-state solution in Palestine, disarming Hezbollah, and more. At that time, the U.S. government under Bush rejected it. A decade later, regional developments altered the Islamic Republic’s position such that agreement under those terms was no longer acceptable to it.

[19] Other options — such as attacking oil-refining facilities or tankers — could also serve a dual strategic function for the U.S.: weakening the Islamic Republic’s position by imposing heavy economic losses and delaying military reconstruction, while indirectly striking China by disrupting the flow of discounted, sanctioned Iranian oil.

[20] The name of the U.S. military operation targeting the Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan nuclear facilities on 22 May 2025.

[21] “Keeping the country in a state of power vacuum would not only practically guarantee the non-reconstruction of military capacity (for any faction seeking power), but would also provide Israel with greater and longer-term room to maneuver in intervening in an Iranian civil war. It is no secret that Israel has for years engaged in dealings with various Iranian political actors — from reformists to Pahlavi supporters, the Mojahedin, and factions of nationalist forces in minority regions. If it could align U.S. and European will behind such a scenario, it could keep domestic adversaries locked in conflict for years, ensuring none becomes strong enough to defeat the others.” — Quoted from the committee text: “Israel–Iran War: Why and How Far?” (June 2025).

[22] The phrase “the day after the deal” is metaphorical; the agreement could take place behind closed doors and remain unofficial or unannounced for years, becoming identifiable only through its manifestations in reality — particularly at the regional level.