Post-bloody ThuFriday: Obstacles and solutions

Abbas Goya - February 2, 2026

Undoubtedly, every protester who took part in the January uprising and lived through Bloody ThuFriday (Thursday–Friday, January 8-9) is grappling with the same question: What are the obstacles, and what are the solutions? There is no doubt that the brutal massacre (of tens) of thousands of protesters marked a turning point in the struggle of the working masses to overthrow the Islamic Republic. Yet despite deploying an unprecedented level of violence, the regime failed to achieve its central objective: it was unable to re-establish a level of terror comparable to that of the 1980s.

The first clear sign of this failure was the reopening of the Internet in Iran. A torrent of testimonies, images, and revelations flooded the world. People spoke out without fear, and funerals became mass political gatherings. The genocidal violence of Bloody ThuFriday did not paralyze the masses in the way repression did in the 1980s. Instead, it produced defiant spirit reminiscent of Iran’s Bloody Friday on September 8, 1978, and the aftermath of Russia’s Bloody Sunday of January 22, 1905. The masses were not intimidated—but neither were they naive or suicidal. They retreated. The pressing question now, shared by millions, is this: How can the obstacle of repression be confronted in the next wave?

In the aftermath of the bloody Friday of 1978, the slogan “Arm us, leaders” emerged in the 79 revolution. Even if a similar sentiment existed among the January protesters, we face a fundamental problem: this uprising has no leadership. Even the Voice of America—the mouthpiece of the U.S. government—does not buy the fiction that Reza Pahlavi’s calls for protest mobilized millions who were already in the streets. Leaving aside the media outlets attempting to manufacture public consent for Pahlavi, his so-called “credibility” was bestowed upon him by the Islamic Republic itself and by the Tudehists—aka 'anti-imperialist', pro-Islamist left—despite the fact that even Trump refused to take him seriously. Ironically, the “leadership” title that BBC Persian, Radio Farda, and Iran International failed to secure for him was handed over by the IRI and echoed by sections of the so-called “anti-imperialist” left. This blank check, granted to the son of a deposed monarch, will be used the moment protests resume—to strike against the left, socialists, and the working class.

If the January uprising has no leader, then who will arm whom—and how—to overthrow the Islamic Republic? In a unipolar world, and in the absence of an organized socialist party in Iran, desperate and wounded masses may cling to any rope. Some may even buy into the deceptive image of the United States as a savior, imagining Trump as an agent of liberation. Their complaint today is not that Trump is hostile—but that he failed to deliver.

Except for the self-deluded, it is hard to believe anyone genuinely sees salvation in this picture.

So what is our answer to the masses’ question about obstacles and solutions? They demand clarity and decisiveness. Society will not pause or fall into a coma. If we fail to answer, it will turn to anyone who claims to have an answer. A viable response can resolve the leadership crisis of the working class in its struggle to overthrow the Islamic Republic and seize political power.

The first step is to clearly identify the obstacle. With a critical look at ourselves, we must admit that by repeatedly insisting “the Islamic Republic cannot suppress,” we gravely underestimated the capacity of its repressive machinery. For years, we have pointed to the absence of independent labor organizations, the fragility of civil movements, and the lack of socialist leadership within the broader opposition. We attempted—again and again—to compensate for these weaknesses. Every attempt was met with naked, merciless repression. Each uprising ended the same way: instead of advancing, we counted the dead, mourned, organized campaigns for prisoners, and reassured ourselves that “millions in the streets will overwhelm the state.”

January 8-9, 2026 shattered this illusion. The claim that “they cannot suppress” was exposed as false. The central problem of every political movement in Iran—organized or spontaneous, mass-based or limited—has always been, and remains, the machine of repression. This hellish apparatus, powered by the regime’s near-superhuman capacity for violence, has been consistently underestimated, at devastating cost. From June 20, 1981 to today, every gathering—whether of two people or two million—has faced the same vampire machine.

The Islamic Republic functions like a cult not merely because of its religious ideology, but because it represents the culmination of political Islam as a reactionary movement. Despite deep economic, political, social, cultural, and ideological crises—and despite growing international isolation—it continues to drag its political corpse forward on the shoulders of a vast and brutal repressive apparatus. This apparatus combines classical military forces with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the Basij, private militias, multiple intelligence agencies, Islamic councils, proxy forces such as Fatemiyoun and Zainabiyoun, the Popular Mobilization Forces, and Lebanese Hezbollah—supplemented by ideological institutions, however hollow they may now be. This configuration gives the Islamic Republic a uniquely resilient capacity for repression.

For the same reason, what blocks the labor movement at every step is not a lack of will, consciousness, leadership, or political potential. The decisive and immediate bottleneck is the repressive apparatus itself.

It is true that the regime has suffered setbacks. The Internet—except during moments of mass slaughter—remains partially open. Stoning has virtually disappeared. Women’s freedom of dress has been imposed in practice, at enormous cost. But nearly half a century of experience shows that the regime does not consider these concessions violations of its “red lines of survival.” There are two lines it will never cross:

1. Economic plunder. The massacre of over 1,500 people in November 2019—especially in Mahshahr—symbolizes the regime’s response when its mechanisms of accumulation are threatened.

2. Political power. Whenever its political existence is endangered, the Islamic Republic will unleash unlimited violence, without apology or concealment.

So what is the solution?

What follows is not definitive. It is an attempt to loosen the knot confronting the uprising of working people. Criticize it ruthlessly—or replace it with your own.

A political solution is always preferable to a violent one. But what political measures could realistically slow the machine of repression? Any such measures would, for now, have to occur outside Iran—because until we answer the question of how to confront repression, any call for mass action inside the country is irresponsible. One might imagine international labor strikes in solidarity, or actions like those of Italian dockworkers who refused to service ships bound for Israel. One might imagine global socialist parties filling the streets in protest. But even if all the stars aligned, experience suggests the Islamic Republic would not retreat. When its survival is at stake, it does not care about protests abroad—or even diplomacy. It is not a conventional state.

Therefore, defeating the repressive apparatus ultimately requires forceful act. Two general paths exist: internal collapse or direct confrontation. While efforts to split the ranks of the repressive forces must continue, the decisive moment will likely be a face-to-face confrontation. But which force is capable of defeating such a machine?

Typically, two options are discussed: the masses themselves, and/or foreign states. Experience shows that the regime’s apparatus is vulnerable to intervention by powerful states, particularly those with which it is already in conflict. Israeli penetration of military and intelligence structures—and the blows delivered by Israel and the United States during the Twelve Day War—demonstrate this vulnerability. However, imperialist intervention is not only hostile to the interests of wage-earners; it would almost certainly consolidate the regime domestically. Promises of U.S. intervention passify the masses. During the Twelve Day War, only Reza Pahlavi—speaking from Netanyahu’s shadow—called for protests, and not a single person responded. A U.S. assault that might even result in collapse of the regime would represent a historic defeat, paving the way for openly far-right outcomes regardless of the future government’s form.

The issue, then, is not abstract opposition to foreign intervention, but a concrete question: intervention by whom, and for what purpose? As long as such intervention excludes the working masses and contradicts their interests, it cannot serve emancipation. There is, in my view, no state on earth fit for such a role.

What remains, therefore, is direct confrontation between the people and the repressive apparatus. Without internal collapse and without state backing, the arming of the masses becomes the only remaining path. This is possible only through a general, mass uprising. Otherwise, resistance will be confined to specific regions—eg Kurdistan, Balochistan—and either crushed or reduced to prolonged guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare, in any form, is ultimately reactionary, as it sidelines the masses.

A third alternative would resemble the Spanish Civil War: calling on socialists and freedom lovers worldwide to join Iranian workers in confronting the regime while resisting imperialist intervention. Such a path would require extensive preparation and could only emerge alongside a mass uprising.

This text is merely a beginning. Criticize it openly and without hesitation—or propose your own solution. What matters most is that we clearly identify the obstacle and advance toward a practical solution with honesty and resolve.

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