First Normalization, Then Nuclearization

In March 2010, Zbigniew Brzezinski made the comments in an interview on an Al Jazeera English TV show titled Empire that "The US can live with a nuclear Iran.” His justification was that since the United States had been able to live with a nuclear China, it could also live with Iran. Decades earlier, in 1979 — the year of the Iranian Revolution — Brzezinski was the National Security Advisor in Jimmy Carter’s administration, the same government that paved the way for Khomeini’s accession to power. Barack Obama and Jimmy Carter belong to the same faction of the Democratic Party, so much so that Obama’s cabinet, many years later, looked very similar to Carter’s — though Brzezinski did not hold an official position then.

At that time he played the role of ideologue for that faction of the Democratic Party. In other words, when Brzezinski was promoting acceptance of an Islamic nuclear republic, the U.S. was preparing itself for the presidential candidacy of Brzezinski’s protégé, Barack Obama. The strategy of accommodating an Islamic nuclear republic resulted in negotiations that produced the JCPOA (Iran nuclear deal).

The JCPOA implicitly accepted that Iran had the potential to build an atomic bomb over a 10–15-year period. More precisely, the Obama administration knowingly entered into an agreement with Iran that, by the end of it, could allow the Islamic Republic to possess a nuclear bomb.

The Islamic Republic was not a desirable government for integration into the global capitalist market — but both wings of the U.S. ruling elite understood its instrumental role in suppressing workers and saw it as necessary for maintaining and continuing capitalist relations in Iran. Neither of the two wings — liberal or conservative — in the U.S. wanted to change the Islamic regime; rather, they have supported it in various forms since it came to power. Both ruling wings in the U.S. want normalization of relations between the U.S. and Iran.

Moreover, both factions can live with a nuclear Iran on the condition that the Islamic government becomes “normal” in a conventional sense. Normalization of the Islamic Republic, from the West’s perspective, acquired different meanings over time: in one era, normalization meant the ability to integrate into the global market; after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the unsuccessful attempt by the U.S. to stabilize itself with Bush Senior’s New World Order doctrine, that definition changed. What remained was the containment of the Islamic Republic — a containment strategy that makes sense in regional terms.

As far as the West is concerned, the main criterion for determining the status of Middle Eastern governments is their relations with Israel. Therefore, from the West’s point of view, normalization of the Islamic government is a function of normalizing its relationship with Israel. Regardless of the regime’s regional interventions, as long as Iran remains hostile toward Israel, it is not considered “normal.” The difference between the two main factions in the U.S. lies in their tactics for containing and managing Iran’s relationship with Israel.

The Democrats believe that by creating an initial agreement and reducing tensions with Tehran, it might be possible — alongside Iran’s nuclear development — to push the Islamic Republic over subsequent negotiations toward becoming a “normal government.” Conservatives, however, see normalization of Iran’s government as a necessary precondition for accommodating a nuclear Iran. Israel perceives the Islamic Republic as a serious existential threat in the region and is adjacent to a faction of political Islam that has been strengthened by the Islamic Republic. In 2006, Israel engaged in a proxy war with Iran in Lebanon — a war where it was forced to retreat.

Thus, the right-wing government of Israel and, by extension, the right-wing Republican faction of the U.S. claim that they cannot live with an Islamic nuclear republic. For this faction of the U.S. ruling elite, normalization of relations between Israel and Iran is a prerequisite for tolerating Iran’s nuclearization. Trump, with this worldview, nevertheless came into power inheriting the legacy of the JCPOA — and he fulfilled one of his electoral promises by tearing up that agreement. Trump’s strategy regarding Iran can perhaps best be summarized as: “First normalization, then nuclear.”

With this premise — which is my assumption — we can now examine the ongoing tension between Iran and the U.S. For a more comprehensive discussion, see “The U.S.–Iran Skirmished and We.”

Now the question is: if the outcome of the current tension between the two reactionary states — America and Iran — is negotiation, what will that negotiation focus on? Simply reaching an agreement is not enough. The U.S. and Iran had already been on the path to agreement. The only superficial difference between now and four years ago is the presidency of Donald Trump! The current tensions were initiated by the present U.S. administration. So it is this current government of the United States that has demands from Iran.

Although Trump initially presented a long list of conditions for negotiation, he soon dropped those and limited them to two main topics: Iran’s nuclearization and the Islamic Republic’s long-range missiles — which can apparently target Israel. He ultimately linked long-range missiles to nuclear capability, thus reducing his demand to one central point: preventing the Islamic Republic from acquiring nuclear weapons. For the U.S., all other aspects of relations with Iran — including regional interventions — are secondary to this issue. Trump’s strategy, in essence, is to prevent the Islamic Republic from building a nuclear bomb.

The unwritten condition for negotiation is accepting that the Islamic Republic does not pursue nuclear weapons. The Islamic Republic knows that simply going to the negotiating table means accepting the U.S. demand to abandon its nuclear weapons project. The only difference between Trump’s JCPOA and Obama’s JCPOA is that Trump intends to close the loopholes in the agreement that would allow the Islamic Republic to build a nuclear bomb. Trump declared this intention already during his election campaign. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic knows well that part of the U.S. ruling elite is hostile.

Therefore, the current tactic of the Islamic Republic is to buy time until the next U.S. presidential election. The Islamic regime even put its hopes on the U.S. midterm elections last November, betting that if it survives until the next U.S. presidential election — which may be won by the Democrats — the chances of reviving the JCPOA would be high. At the same time, the crushing economic pressures from maximum U.S. sanctions have cornered the Islamic regime and pushed it toward bargaining operations.

Iran’s aggressive military actions in the Persian Gulf — which began with the attacking of oil tankers — eventually succeeded in seriously damaging Aramco’s oil facilities in Saudi Arabia. All of these military operations are essentially part of Iran’s “negotiation” with the Trump administration. The Islamic Republic, on the condition of denying nuclear weapons to Trump, will not sit at the negotiating table with him. “Negotiations” between Iran and the U.S. to date have taken place through Iranian drones attacking facilities or oil tankers on one side, and Trump's threatening tweets on the other.

These “negotiations,” unlike closed-door talks, occur in the open and are broadcast by media worldwide. Iran has sent two clear messages to the U.S. through its military actions:

It is not willing to accept the U.S. condition to abandon its nuclear weapons project; therefore it will not sit at the negotiating table for a new agreement. Supreme Leader Khamenei declared this explicitly. Either the JCPOA or nothing!

In response to maximum American sanctions, Iran is using maximum own pressure — military bargaining operations — to force a cancellation or easing of economic sanctions. The Islamic Republic believes that if enough large governments, including European and non-European ones, oppose rising oil prices, then the Trump administration might relent and cancel or reduce sanctions.

On the other hand, the Trump administration, by applying heavy economic pressure, hopes to bring the Islamic Republic to its knees over time. So far the Trump administration has remained faithful to this strategy. The U.S. has largely abandoned direct military threats against Iran despite its earlier tweets. Trump says he is in no hurry to start negotiations. He hopes to weaken the Islamic Republic over time until it submits.

Who will win this confrontation — which has placed the Iranian working class and poor under crushing pressure? It appears that the third force on both sides — class forces, not state elites — will determine the outcome. In the U.S., if Trump loses in the next election, some believe the Islamic Republic might gain the upper hand. While that is a possibility, the Democratic Party is not homogeneous, and it is unclear which faction would have more support if tensions with Iran become a major electoral issue.

In Iran, the only real chance for the people lies in overthrowing the Islamic Republic under the leadership of a worker-socialist movement.

***