A Socialist Position on the "War"
Abbas Goya - February 27, 2026
War propaganda by the United States and Iran in the current period does not differ in any meaningful way from similar episodes over the past two decades. The positions adopted by most political organizations, so far as I have examined them, are likewise largely the same as those they took in earlier confrontations. Broadly speaking, three main approaches can be distinguished:
1. Supporters of War
One spectrum -- composed of monarchists, the MEK, republicans, pro-Western liberals & social democrats, and sections of Kurdish nationalist forces -- openly defends the prospect of “war.” These currents advocate “regime change” from above, without relying on the direct and organized power of the people themselves.
The Worker-Communist Party of Iran (WPI) adopts essentially the same position, albeit expressed in different terminology under the banner of the “overthrow movement.” It evaluates military action positively, on the condition that U.S. and Israeli strikes target institutions of the ruling establishment.
2. Opponents of War/Pro IRI
This spectrum includes the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) and its supporters abroad. In addition, the so-called Tudehists -parties and organizations close to the Tudeh Party and the Majority faction- as well as certain marginal “anti-imperialist” left tendencies such as Toofan, Rah-e Kargar, the Hekmatist-Rasmi, and some anarchist currents.
They explain the political motives of war through broad and generalized concepts such as “imperialist war,” “consolidation of spheres of influence,” and the “geopolitical position” of states. War, in their discourse, is described in abstract terms, as devastation, a dark scenario, and social catastrophe. Their justification ultimately rests on appeals to humanism.
3. The Socialist Position
This position, less frequently articulated, approaches war not through universal and abstract definitions, but within the concrete framework of class struggle. In this perspective, the forces involved are not assessed through generalized moral judgments about “war” as an abstract phenomenon. Rather, they are evaluated according to the class positions and material interests of the contending sides.
This text examines the question of war from that standpoint.
Before proceeding further, three new factors must be added to the equation—factors capable of altering the balance of power, the scope of U.S.–Israeli intervention, and the trajectory of social responses:
First, the support of a section of the frustrated and embittered masses for the very idea of war. Even if limited or unstable, this phenomenon signals the depth of dissatisfaction and alienation from the status quo. In the absence of a clear and credible perspective for change from below, parts of society may come to view U.S.–Israeli intervention as a possible agent of transformation.
Second, the experience of the so-called “twelve-day war.” Even if limited in scale, it transformed the political and psychological atmosphere of society. Military confrontation has moved from the level of rhetorical threat to that of a plausible and imaginable reality. War between Israel-U.S. and Iran is no longer merely a propaganda scenario, it has become either a lived experience or something palpably close to one.
Third, the revolutionary uprising of December–January, despite its short duration, was oriented toward smashing the state machine itself. It demonstrated how rapidly protests can escalate from economic grievances to directly targeting the entirety of the political system. From this angle, the question of political power is not monopolized by U.S.–Israeli military intervention. Rather, it must be understood in connection with the actual and potential capacities of class struggle within society.
With these assumptions in mind, the first puzzle in formulating a position on a possible U.S. war against Iran concerns the very definition of “war” in political discourse. When we speak of war, what precisely do we mean? What political motivations are behind it? Is it going to be limited and targeted strike? A multi-day air campaign? Or a long-term project aimed at collapsing and reconstructing the political order?
Forty-seven years of continuous tension between the US and the Islamic Republic across political, military, economic, and diplomatic arenas demonstrate that war can take multiple forms and pursue varying objectives. Crippling sanctions, cyberwarfare, targeted assassinations, and limited military strikes all form part of a spectrum of tools deployed within what can be understood as a prolonged confrontation, a kind of “extended war.”
If the U.S. were to launch direct military action against Iran, two distinct political motives could be identified at different levels:
1. Tactical Motive
The containment or destruction of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear and missile capabilities. In this scenario, the publicly stated objective is limited: deterrence, punishment, or rollback of specific military capacities—without formally embarking on a regime-change project.
2. Strategic Motive
Transformation of the power structure itself—i.e., regime change. Here, military action is not simply about curbing a weapons program. It seeks to alter the internal balance of forces and create the conditions for political transition, whether through direct collapse, prolonged attrition, or a reconfiguration of factional forces at the top of the state.
Without distinguishing between these tactical and strategic levels, any stance on “war” remains abstract. The issue is not whether war is morally good or bad. The real questions are: which war? For what objective? Under what balance of forces? And with what class and political consequences?
Tactical Military Confrontation
The U.S. ruling establishment is divided over how to address Iran’s nuclear program. The disagreement concerns methods and the degree to which a “nuclear-capable Iran” can be tolerated.
Within the liberal tradition associated with the Democratic Party, the idea of containing a nuclear-capable Iran- even one on the threshold of weaponization-has been raised. The logic of balance-of-power theory suggests that the United States could “live with” such a reality, provided Iran were integrated into a regional deterrence framework. From this perspective, the JCPOA was not designed to dismantle Iran’s nuclear capacity altogether, but to suspend, monitor, and buy time.
By contrast, while the Republican Party does not differ fundamentally from the Democrats at the macro-strategic level- and has itself played roles in shaping Islamist forces within regional politics- it exhibits greater sensitivity toward the prospect of “nuclear political Islam.” This sensitivity is particularly pronounced when aligned with Israeli security concerns, where acceptance of a nuclear-capable Iran is deemed far more problematic.
Nevertheless, the dispute over a “nuclear Iran” is not a strategic disagreement over the existence of the Islamic Republic as such. The core issue concerns levels of threat, deterrence, and regional balance—not necessarily the elimination or preservation of the political structure.
Prior to the “twelve-day war,” Iran’s nuclear project was disrupted through sanctions, sabotage, cyberattacks, and targeted assassinations. In the limited military confrontation that followed, controlled strikes inflicted significant infrastructural damage. Yet the consequences of even this tactical conflict were severe for workers:
Social protests that had preceded the war were halted, and public space was securitized. Protesters were effectively forced into retreat.
The ruling establishment, aware of its military vulnerability, anticipated confronting a population that had witnessed its weakness. Under the pretext of “spying for Israel,” it launched waves of arrests and executions to mask its fragility and suppress mounting social anger through fear.
After the bombing of three nuclear facilities, U.S. operations did not expand further. This suggests that, at least at that stage, military action was conceived tactically—not as the opening phase of an all-out regime-change campaign.
Strategic Military Confrontation
Over nearly five decades of U.S.–Iran relations, substantial evidence indicates that U.S. policy -regardless of partisan variation- has followed a relatively consistent pattern. The United States moves seriously toward regime change only when two conditions coincide:
Widespread mass protests create a real prospect of structural collapse.
The alternative force carries a socialist and anti-capitalist orientation.
Such conditions existed in 1978–79. The 1979 revolution emerged from the protests of workers and the socialist left at the time had a genuine opportunity to lead the revolutionary process and seize political power. International maneuvers surrounding the transition of power reflected that reality.
The more recent January uprising briefly reopened the horizon of regime collapse. From a Western perspective, it risked escaping the control of all established actors, similar to the spontaneous uprising of February 1979. Under such circumstances, socialist forces could potentially shape or even dominate developments. This possibility constitutes a red line for the United States and could serve as motivation for pursuing regime-change policy in order to contain the uprising.
The United States has no universal formula for regime change, and regime change does not necessarily entail total structural collapse. It may involve leadership removal, transformation through pressure, or direct confrontation.
Military threats and limited strikes aim primarily to compel structural transformation. What Washington describes as “complete surrender” effectively means converting the Islamic Republic into a conventional state. If the danger of an organized socialist uprising is neutralized, the intensity of confrontation may decline.
At this juncture, the Islamic Republic’s bargaining leverage is less about enriched uranium and more about suppressing revolutionary unrest. The intensity of U.S. war posturing correlates with the vitality of revolutionary movements: the more forcefully such movements assert themselves, the more visible U.S. military deployments become.
In summary, what is commonly labeled “war” often refers to U.S.–Israeli intervention framed as regime change. Yet beneath that framing lies a class dimension: an effort to contain or neutralize revolutionary uprisings among the working population. Political positions must be evaluated within that framework.
The Socialist Distinction
The socialist position opposes U.S. military intervention from the standpoint of working-class interests only as it is aimed to contain its revolutionary uprising—not from an abstract moral rejection of war against IRI/Iran. It does not align with neither anti-war position nor with the view that U.S. strikes benefit an “overthrow movement. External states do not act in the service of domestic revolutionary forces; they intervene only when doing so secures their own strategic alternatives.
Thus, the socialist stance rejects both reliance on US intervention and reduction to nationalist or formulaic anti-imperialist rhetoric against a war on the IRI/Iran. The central task is preserving the independence and continuity of working-class struggle for political power—ensuring that it does not become a pawn in interstate rivalries.
Socialist Practice
Even if military strikes were to hit centers of power, real transformation would occur only if those centers were seized by organized revolutionary forces. Therefore, the strategic principle remains the continuation and deepening of independent working-class organization toward seizure of power, without reliance on or hope in US intervention.
The precise form such practice takes cannot be predetermined. It depends on concrete conditions. But the starting point is clear: consolidation of an independent socialist position; building lasting worker alliances at local levels; strengthening organization among workers; and grounding struggle in working-class internationalism.
Without such foundations, no social uprising, however dramatic the international crisis surrounding it, can achieve a lasting outcome.
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